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 In the field of international politics, one of the most studied and analyzed topics is 
the notion of coercion, or the attempt by an international actor to use either the threat or 
actual use of force to compel an adversary to change its behavior.1  Some versions of 
coercion are relatively easy to understand—diplomatic coercion, for example, seeks to 
compel an actor to change its behavior using only threats, or all-out war, which uses any 
force necessary to change an actor’s behavior. Other versions of coercion, on the other 
hand, are less straightforward.   Perhaps the most amorphous type of coercion is when 
states or other actors seek to use limited use of force to change behavior—often referred 
to as compellence.   
 In the winter of 1972, President Richard Nixon sought to coerce the North 
Vietnamese to accept concessions at the peace table using compellence in the form of a 
massive bombing campaign known as Linebacker II.2  This campaign targeted the large 
North Vietnamese cities of Hanoi and Haiphong for the first time during the war in an 
attempt to intimidate the North into accepting three main concessions desired by South 
Vietnam and proposed by Henry Kissinger and the United States.  In the end, however, 
these three concessions—involving the makeup of a post-war tripartite commission, the 
strength of the DMZ separating North and South, and the issue of Communist troops in 
South Vietnam—were not met, and the United States instead chose to accept an 
agreement less friendly to South Vietnam and then pushed this agreement on the South 
                                                
1 Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 6. 
2 Linebacker I was another large-scale bombing campaign conducted by Nixon and the United States in the 
spring and summer of 1972.  The Linebacker II bombings are also often known as the “Christmas 
bombings” due to their occurrence during the Christmas holiday season in December—even though no 
bombs were actually dropped on Christmas itself. 
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and its premier Nguyen Van Thieu until they too accepted.  While the United States did 
secure some ancillary benefits such as credibility in the region, its main goals were not 
reached and thus its attempt at compellence cannot be considered a success. 
 Why did the United States fail to achieve any major concessions through 
compellence?  This paper will posit two main reasons: the United States did not possess 
the requisite capabilities to sufficiently affect North Vietnamese morale, and it also failed 
to posses enough credibility to convince the North Vietnamese the bombing would 
continue long-term.  Because of these deficiencies in two fundamental areas of 
compellence theory, the United States was unable to achieve its goals and its actions 
stand as an important lesson for those considering compellence. 
6 
Chapter 1:  Compellence Theory 
 
Since this paper will seek to explain Nixon’s Linebacker II bombing campaign as an 
example of successful compellence, it is necessary to first address the issue of 
compellence itself: what it is, when it is used, and how it can fail or succeed.  Only once 
these questions have been answered can one examine in detail the specific case of the 
Christmas bombings. 
 
What is Compellence? 
The first and most obvious question is a simple one: what is compellence?  Although the 
question itself is simple, the answer is much more complicated.  Classically, compellence 
is one half of the double-sided coin that is a threat of force.  As Thomas Schelling notes 
in his landmark work Arms and Influence, compellence is “a threat intended to make an 
adversary do something,” whereas the other side of the coin, deterrence, is “a threat 
intended to keep him from starting something.” In this way, then, compellence becomes 
much harder than deterrence, since compellence requires a definite action, whereas 
deterrence requires an action only if the adversary refuses to back down.1  Although this 
action is usually military in nature, it can sometimes apply to economic or other fields of 
international politics.2  Further, as noted by Alexander George and Williams Simons in 
their book The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, compellence can range from “threats of a 
nonviolent break in negotiations” to, as was the case with the Linebacker II bombings, 
                                                
1Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 69-70 
2 David E Johnson, Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft, V, Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum 
of Operations (prepared for the United States Army by the RAND Corp,, Arroyo Center, 2002), 8. 
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“threats of escalating a war.” 3 In general, however, compellence can be said to be a 
limited use of force aimed at a particular aspect of the adversary, whether it be military or 
otherwise.4  This idea of a limited use of force designed to compel an opponent to change 
its actions is at the heart of the reasoning behind the Linebacker II bombing campaign. 
 This definition, of course, still leaves much room for differing tactics and types of 
compellence.  Alexander George, for example, differentiates between “strong” and 
“weak” versions of compellence, with the “weak” variant being one in which the 
compeller takes a “wait-and-see” approach and the “strong” variant being one where the 
compeller sets a “tacit ultimatum” that the adversary must act by or risk increased 
hostility and punishment.5  Robert Art also makes a distinction, this time between 
“demonstrative use of force”—i.e. compellence—and “full-scale use of force—i.e. war.  
As Art himself notes, of course, “the line between limited use and war is not easy to 
draw, and it depends to a degree on the situation at hand.”6 
 Robert Pape makes another distinction when he classifies examples of 
compellence as either “punishment” or “denial.”  For Pape, the punishment form of 
compellence occurs when a state attempts to raise costs and risks to civilian population, 
either by direct attacks on civilian centers or by killing enough military personnel to 
                                                
3 Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994), 30-37. 
4 Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, 
Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), 18.  Others have defined compellence as using 
purely threats of force, rather than any actual use of force, to achieve a change in an adversary’s behavior, 
but for the purposes of this paper the classical definition set forth by Schelling and, to an extent, George 
will be used.  See Lawrence Freedman, ed., Strategic Coercion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
5 George, Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, 27. 
6 Robert J. Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?” in The United States and Coercive 
Diplomacy, Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2003), 360. 
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weaken the resolve of civilian populations.7  As Pape notes, however, although there are 
a number of instances of states attempting to compel using this method, they are rarely 
successful, thanks to a number of mitigating factors including the separation between the 
government and the people and the hardening of wills during wartime.8  On the other 
hand, compellence by denial “operates by using military means to prevent the target from 
attaining its political objectives or territorial goals.”9  As will be seen, the strategy of the 
Linebacker II bombing campaign contained elements of both Pape’s denial and 
punishment versions of compellence.  Indeed, some authors, like Alexander George, 
simply do not make any distinction, simply stating that the goal of compellence is to 
“affect the enemy’s will,” whether it is the will of the adversary state’s population or 
military.10  Since in Vietnam the civilian population and the military—whether Viet Cong 
or army regulars—were so inextricably linked, it makes sense that the United States 
would seek to compel both spheres.  
 Yet another strategy within the umbrella of compellence is the issue of 
brinkmanship and risk.  Schelling, long considered the originator of what would later 
become known as “madman theory” under Nixon, notes that “sometimes we can get a 
little credit for not having everything quite under control, for being a little impulsive or 
unreliable.”11  In other words, it is to the advantage of a state to behave irrationally from 
time to time in order to produce doubt in the adversary’s mind.  With this doubt planted 
in the adversary’s head, they will never know for sure what response their actions will 
                                                
7 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 13.  For a further discussion of 
the distinction between denial and punishment strategies, as well as an incorporation of risk strategy, see 
Art, “Coercive Diplomacy,” 362-365. 
8 Pape, Bombing to Win, 21-27. 
9 Ibid., 13. 
10 George, Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, 18. 
11 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 38. 
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garner, and, as such, will refrain from doing anything overly bold in case the “madman” 
across from them decides to respond in an irrational way.  This idea forms the traditional, 
deterrence model of brinkmanship and madman theory.  As Schelling makes abundantly 
clear, however, this theory can just as easily be applied to compellence, especially 
compellence in the form of limited use of force.  “The danger of major war,” Schelling 
posits, “is almost certainly increased by the occurrence of a limited war.”  As such, 
limited war has two goals.  One goal “is to inflict costs directly on the other side,” while 
the other is “to expose the other party, together with oneself, to a heightened risk of major 
war.”12  In this way limited war compels doubly: by inflicting actual costs in the present 
and threatening to inflict much higher costs in the future.  By doling out equal risk to both 
the compeller and the adversary, the threat becomes that much more genuine, thus 
becoming stronger.  As will be discussed, Nixon and his government made full use of this 
double compellence to convince the North Vietnamese to return to the negotiating table 
in the winter of 1972. 
 
When is Compellence Used? 
Besides knowing what compellence is, it is also important to understand when and in 
what context compellence is undertaken as a strategy in international politics.  As noted 
above, compellence seeks to make “the value of resistance appear worse than the value of 
compliance” to an adversary.13  States generally use compellence to achieve one of three 
objectives: to either make the adversary start—or, in some cases like those surrounding 
Linebacker II, restart—an action, stop an action, or change their action in some other 
                                                
12 Ibid., 105. 
13 Johnson, Conventional Coercion, 15. 
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way.14  In many ways, compellence is a highly desirable tactic for a state seeking to 
change an adversary’s actions without spending as much—in both blood and treasure—as 
would be spent during an all-out war.  Quite simply, no state, even a superpower, has the 
means to fight a war every time it wishes another state to change its behavior.  By using 
compellence, a state can avoid war yet still achieve most if not all of its foreign policy 
goals vis-à-vis a given adversary country.  Further, because many commitments are 
interdependent, compellence becomes a tool to show resolve and bolster credibility both 
in the theater where the compellence is taking place, and, potentially, on the world stage 
as well.15 
 Compellence on the whole, then, is an oft-used tool for any state or other actor 
that has sought to alter the actions of another state without descending into all-out war.  
However, there are a number of factors states must consider before beginning 
compellence, and thus it is not the easy option it may at first seem. If a state does in fact 
choose a compellence strategy, of course, it cannot then simply sit back and wait for the 
opposing state to change its behavior.  Once again, there are a number of factors that 
determine whether or not compellence will succeed.  First, of course, a state must define 
what it considers to be successful compellence.  In general, according to Gary Schaub, 
“compellence can be said to have succeeded when the target actor bends to the wishes of 
the initiating actor, and to have failed if the target actor successfully ignores the 
initiator’s threats.”  Schaub goes on to point out, however, that compellence can also fail 
if the “initiator” is made to use more force to achieve its goals.16  In other words, if a state 
                                                
14 Gary Schaub, Jr., “Compellence: Resuscitating the Concept,” in Strategic Coercion, ed. Lawrence 
Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 44. 
15 See Schelling, Arms and Influence, 55. 
16 Schaub, Jr., “Compellence,” in Strategic Coercion, 44. 
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is forced to move from threat to actual force, or, in Schelling’s scenario, if major war 
breaks out, this, too, constitutes compellence failure.  When choosing whether to pursue a 
compellence strategy, there are three central factors that any state must consider and 
address to achieve success: capability, credibility, and the clarity of the state’s demands.   
  
 
Attributes of Compellence 
1) Capability 
A necessary factor in any compellence strategy is the requirement of a certain level of 
capability to achieve the desired result.  When deciding whether to compel, a state must 
first determine if it has the capability to compel its adversary in a given manner.  This is 
not, as David Johnson points out, the sum total of the state’s “raw military power,” but 
instead “the capability that the [compeller] can realistically bring to bear in a particular 
situation.”  
Further, a state mulling a compellence strategy must also determine whether 
compelling in the manner chosen will be effective. Again, David Johnson sums up the 
issue nicely: “The milder a threat is, the more willing the target state may be to take a 
chance that it cannot actually be carried out.”17  In other words, if a state is threatened 
with a risk it is willing to take, there is a good chance the compellence will fail.  The 
relative military capabilities of a compelling state must therefore be high enough—and of 
the appropriate type—in relation to the adversary to allow for compellence that is 
directed at a particular area and strong enough to force the adversary to back down.  To 
                                                
17 Johnson, Conventional Coercion, 20.  See also Schaub, Jr., “Compellence,” in Strategic Coercion, 50-
54. 
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use an obvious example, if a given state is generally more powerful than its adversary but 
is separated by an ocean and has no planes or missiles, compellence by attacking 
population centers would clearly be off the table.  Furthermore, a compelling state must 
factor in potential counter-compellence by its adversary, in which the adversary seeks to 
impose costs on the compeller by using countermeasures, whether these are as simple as 
SAM sites or as complicated as potential retaliatory use of nuclear weapons.18  In other 
words, the compelling state must seek to ensure not only that its target will eventually 
comply, but also that the costs inflicted upon the compelling state will not outweigh the 
gains derived from a change in the target state’s actions.  This issue would crop up in the 
Linebacker II bombings when Nixon and some of his aides began to worry about high 
numbers of B-52s being shot down.  If the North Vietnamese had made significant 
changes to the peace agreement, but at the cost of unacceptable losses of United States 
personnel and material, the compellence strategy would have turned out to be a net loss. 
In general, a state must possess the necessary capabilities to compel its adversary 
to change its behavior in some way.  What those necessary capabilities are, of course, 
depends heavily on the situation at hand. 
 
2) Credibility 
Issues of credibility, too, are important to consider when initiating a compellence 
strategy.  One potential problem is that compellence requires a committed effort from a 
state, usually for a relatively long period of time.  At the very least, the compelling state 
must show it has the “will to act with persistence” if the adversary does not change its 
behavior.  This means that a state considering a compellence strategy has to factor in the 
                                                
18 Art, “Coercive Diplomacy” in United States and Coercive Diplomacy, 369-370. 
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possibility that the compellence could last much longer than anticipated.  Indeed, in an 
anarchic political world, just how easily the adversary will break is very hard, if not 
impossible, to determine beforehand.  Once committed, of course, a state has to remain so 
or risk losing credibility not only in regards to its direct adversary but also to other actors 
in other theaters that will look upon the lack of commitment as weakness and potentially 
seek to exploit it—particularly if the state that shows such weakness is a great power 
competing for influence in a region. 
 What makes up a state’s credibility?  For every state, some combination of a) a 
reputation for commitment and b) interests define how “credible” a state is in a given 
interaction. 
 
a) Reputation for Commitment 
By far the most important aspect of a state’s credibility is its ability to remain true to its 
commitments around the world, whatever they may be.  The stronger a commitment, the 
stronger the committed state’s credibility is in the eyes of the other state.  It is often 
difficult to determine just what makes a strong commitment, but Schelling suggests one 
way to ensure the world will see a state as committed to another is “to incur a political 
involvement, to get a nation’s honor, obligation, and diplomatic reputation committed to 
a response.”19  Regardless of how this involvement occurs—whether it is an agreed-upon 
understanding between two countries, or one country maneuvering itself into a position 
where it the other has no choice but to be committed to it20—it often takes a show of 
force to back up the commitment.  Only in this way can a state reassure the state it is 
                                                
19 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 49. 
20 Schelling uses the example of Chiang Kai-shek retreating to the island of Quemoy to force the hand of 
the United States to illustrate how a state can be roped into a commitment.  Ibid., 49-51. 
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committed to and simultaneously show its enemies that the commitment is a strong one. .  
Some commitments need no show of force, however—it is generally assumed a state has 
an extremely strong commitment to defend its own territory, especially if it has held that 
territory for a long period of time.    Either way, a state’s commitments are inextricably 
linked to its capabilities. 
 If a state credibly commits enough, it can develop a reputation for commitment—
or show a lack thereof.  For example, if a state often backs out of its commitments, an 
adversary state may choose to be bolder against one of the state’s allies, guessing that the 
state will hold true to form and not honor its commitments.  If, on the other hand, a state 
is known for virulently defending even areas where it has little interests, other states will 
be less likely to challenge it and, if they do, more willing to back down in the face of 
compellence. 
 Because a reputation going forward is important, especially to great powers that 
will seek to garner allies in their region or across the globe, states seeking a better 
reputation will be much more likely to hold out to enhance their credibility. States will 
often hold out longer than they otherwise would, Robert Pape notes, “because they 
believe that a defeat or retreat on one issue is likely to encourage further demands on the 
state by its adversaries and defections from its allies.”21  Indeed, this was at least partly 





                                                
21 Pape, Bombing to Win, 35. 
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For both the initiators and targets of compellence, the interests at stake also factor into 
their credibility.  In the compelling state’s case, if it has little real interest in forcing a 
change in the adversary’s actions, the adversary will know it only needs to hold out for a 
short while before the compeller will give up.  On the other hand, if the compelling state 
desperately needs its opponent to change its behavior and the target state knows this, it 
will be more likely to give in rather than face a long struggle. 
 Likewise, if a state is attacking a target that is not directly connected to the 
adversary state’s interests, the likelihood of the compellence strategy being successful 
diminishes, because the adversary state will be willing to give up the target without 
changing its actions.  If the state sees its fundamental interests being targeted, however, it 
may refuse to back down to avoid major credibility losses.  Thus, a compelling state must 
convey the notion that they are seeking to attack a key interest of the rival state, while 
still leaving enough leeway to ensure the target state does not actually become more 
hardened instead of less.  In this way a state’s interests are also connected to how well the 
state conveys that interest—and the threat to that interest, as will be discussed more fully 
in the section below. 
 A compelling state must also realize that its adversary faces credibility issues as 
well.  As Schelling notes, deterrence is relatively easy to comply to: all an adversary state 
must do is nothing.  On the other hand, compellence requires the adversary to visibly 
back down from an engagement, endangering its own credibility in the process.22  This is 
why compellence is often referred to as a “contest of nerve and risk-taking, of pain and 
endurance,” bringing to mind the game of Chicken, where one side must back down 
                                                
22 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 82.  Also see Johnson, Conventional Coercion, 14. 
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eventually or both sides will be subjected to major costs.23  It is in these situations where 
Schelling’s so-called “madman” theory of seeming irrationality can be used to its greatest 
effectiveness—and, arguably, was used to great effectiveness by Nixon during the 
Linebacker II bombings, as is discussed below.  Only if a state is willing to engage in this 
game should it seek to compel. 
 Compellence, then, will only be successful for the acting state if it has the ability 
to commit to its strategy long enough to outlast the credibility concerns of the adversary 
state.  As with capability, how long “long enough” is depends largely on the particular 
situation the compelling country faces. 
 
3) Clarity of Goals 
Another oft-cited factor in the success or failure is the clarity of the goals of the 
compeller, and more specifically how those goals are communicated to the opposing 
state.  At a basic level, this can come in the form of ultimatums to the adversary: we will 
inflict X amount of pain on you until you do Y.  However, as Alexander George points 
out, a state “may not need to state a specific time limit or define the threat of punishment 
for non-compliance.”24  This was the case for the Linebacker II campaign, where no time 
limit was set on the bombing, although a clear goal—the return of the North Vietnamese 
to the peace talks—was stipulated.  Going even further, no communication of any kind 
need be necessary so long as the compeller makes clear through actions—be they military 
movements or other tactics—that they have a goal in mind and will seek to achieve it 
                                                
23 Ibid., 33. 
24 George, Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, 28. 
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through compellence.25  In general, the compeller must make clear its goals to its 
adversary in order to have successful compellence, but these goals need not be directly 
stated or have an absolute deadline, so long as the adversary knows what the purpose of 
the compeller’s actions are. 
 Another issue faced when creating compellence goals is how likely it is that the 
target state will eventually accede to the demands, thereby ensuring successful 
compellence.  If there is simply no way the target state will comply with the demands, it 
follows that there is no way the compellence can be successful.  One way in which the 
demands of compellence can more easily be met is if they are associated to some degree 
with “positive inducements,” which can take the form of “new resources” or “the 
discontinuance of a punitive action previously undertaken.”  On the other hand, too many 
positive inducements at too early a point in time will only bolster the target state’s 
resolve by making the compeller look weak and less committed.26  More generally, a 
state that factors in both “sticks” and “carrots” into its compellence strategy—including 
“the possibility of bargains, negotiations, and compromises as well as coercive threats”—
will have an easier time achieving successful compellence.27  
 
 To fully understand why Nixon’s attempt at compellence failed, this paper will 
discuss each of these three areas—capability, credibility, and clarity of goals—and how 
Nixon, Kissinger, and other United States officials addressed each one.  Before, however, 
                                                
25 Ibid., 30.  For a more in depth discussion of the issue of clarity of demands, see Schaub, Jr., 
“Compellence,” in Strategic Coercion, 54-57. 
26 Art, “Coercive Diplomacy” in United States and Coercive Diplomacy, 388. 
27 George, Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, 25.  See also Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy” in The Use of 
Force: Military Power and International Politics, Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds. (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.), 74-75. 
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a brief discussion of the foreign policy background leading up to the Linebacker II 




Chapter 2:  Background 
 
 
Many historians covering the Paris peace talks and the subsequent Linebacker II 
bombings argue that the central purpose of Nixon’s bombing campaign in December of 
1972 was to compel the North Vietnamese leadership to resume talks in Paris on a 
proposed peace agreement that would create a path for the United States to extract itself 
from all parts of Vietnam, both North and South.1  While this was certainly a goal of the 
bombing, there were many other components to the United States’ objectives.  Jeffrey 
Kimball nicely summarizes the objectives of the United States: “The purpose [of the 
Linebacker II bombing campaign] was to make the North Vietnamese more conciliatory 
on the ambiguities of the agreement, which would both improve the October draft and put 
[President Nixon] in a better position to force Thieu’s acceptance of a settlement.”2  The 
Linebacker II bombing thus sought to achieve two objectives: first, it sought the limited 
goal of simply getting both sides back to the negotiating table; second, it sought the far 
more ambitious goal of gaining actual concessions from the North Vietnamese to placate 
the South’s demands for an agreement that would increase their security, not simply 
allow the United States an easy out. 
 With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that, had the United States and South 
Vietnam taken slightly different approaches, the talks would never have broken down and 
the bombing would have been unnecessary. A brief description of how the talks stalled in 
the first place—and what the United States sought to achieve through its bombing 
                                                
1 For example, see Allen E. Goodman, The Lost Peace: America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of 
the Vietnam War (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 164. 
2 Jeffrey P. Kimball, “’Peace with Honor’: Richard Nixon and the Diplomacy of Threat and Symbolism,” 
in David L. Anderson, ed., Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975 
(Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 174. 
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campaign—is helpful in understanding the context in which the United States turned to 
compellence to achieve its objectives. 
 By October 8, 1972, after years of negotiation—much of which was conducted 
behind the scenes in secret bilateral talks3—Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security 
Adviser, and Le Duc Tho, a member of the North Vietnamese politburo, reached an 
agreement that largely mirrored a previous proposed agreement made by the United 
States on May 8 of the same year. The October 8 agreement—which was altered slightly 
by October 22 by both sides but remained fundamentally the same—in Kissinger’s 
words, “conceded that the South Vietnamese government need not be overthrown as the 
price of a cease-fire,” and the “political structure of South Vietnam was left to the 
Vietnamese to settle [through elections that would appoint a new President and 
government in the South].”4  Later, on October 26, Kissinger remarked in a now-
infamous speech that “peace is at hand” and that a singed agreement would soon be a 
reality.5  Although the October 8 agreement had been close to complete, disagreement 
between the three main players—the United States, South Vietnam, and North 
Vietnam—as well as ulterior motives for each of the three actors caused the peace talks 
to stall indefinitely, causing Nixon and the United States to resort to compellence tactics 
in the form of the Linebacker II bombing operation. As President Nixon himself wrote in 
his diary around the time that the peace talks broke down, “The North wants to humiliate 
the South and us as well…. The South wants to drive the North out of Vietnam and get us 
                                                
3 For a full description of the secret negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam from 1969 
to 1972, see Goodman, The Lost Peace, 100-122. 
4 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 1345.  For a discussion 
of the provisions changed between October 8 and October 22, see Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War 
(Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 338-342. 
5 Ibid., 1399. 
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to stick with them.  As far as we are concerned, we must bring the war to an end on an 
honorable basis.”6  As will be shown, Nixon was not entirely correct in his assessment of 
the three sides’ interests—North Vietnam was clearly more concerned with getting the 
United States out of the country than with “humiliating” them.  Nonetheless, Nixon 
realized each side had its own interests it was trying to reach in the period leading up to 
the Linebacker II bombings.  This section will describe how the conflicting goals of the 
three parties Nixon described led to the breakdown of the talks and the start of bombing. 
 
South Vietnam: Security Before Peace 
Perhaps the most difficult position of any actor in the months leading up to the 
Linebacker II bombings was held by South Vietnam and its president, Nguyen Van 
Thieu.  One the one hand, Thieu and his supporters in the South had to be forceful with 
the United States vis-à-vis the North in order to obtain concessions that ensured the South 
could survive as a political entity following a US withdrawal.  On the other hand, if Thieu 
pushed too hard, the United States could accuse the South of being overly uncooperative 
and sign a separate peace with the North, leaving South Vietnam virtually alone and 
facing a slowly strengthening North Vietnam.  Thus, Thieu had no choice but to walk a 
tightrope between strong demands and complete capitulation to US interests.  This back-
and-forth contributed strongly to the delays and breakdowns in talks, although in the end 
it is likely Thieu would have had to sign the agreement to avoid abandonment by the 
United States. 
 Although Thieu and the South Vietnamese government voiced complaints on 
many facets of the proposed agreement, in general they had three main problems with the 
                                                
6 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 731. 
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proposal drafted by Kissinger and Tho.7  The first was the issue of a tripartite election 
committee that would conduct investigations and eventually design and run new elections 
in South Vietnam.  The three parties involved in the commission were to be the 
government of South Vietnam (GVN; i.e. Thieu), the rival South Vietnamese 
Communists (PRG), and a third group of supposedly disinterested civilians who would 
act as a moderating force.  Thieu and his advisors, however, believed that the 
Communists would quickly subsume the “third force,” giving them a majority on the 
committee.  As one of Thieu’s advisers predicted, “Kissinger was saying not to worry 
because the [election committee] could operate only on the basis of unanimity.  But if our 
side continually vetoed…we and not the Communists would appear to be the real 
obstacles of peace.”8 
 The second and third key complains Thieu and his government had with the Paris 
talks were that the proposed agreements left unanswered the issue of the demilitarized 
zone (DMZ) between North and South Vietnam, and, more troubling, implicitly 
recognized the PRG by including them on a list of signatories.  In both cases, Thieu 
sought to limit the effects of Communist forces.  In regards to the DMZ, Thieu saw a 
strong one as necessary for both protection and to ensure continued sovereignty of the 
South as a separate entity.9  In regards to the PRG, Thieu had consistently maintained 
they were not a legitimate government and did not want to bestow this recognition on 
them.  More crucially, the proposed agreement between the United States and North 
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mind.  For more on Thieu’s objections to the tripartite commission, see Porter, A Peace Denied, 126. 
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(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 300. 
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Vietnam allowed PRG troops—i.e., the Viet Cong—to remain in the South, thus directly 
threatening Thieu’s hold on the government.10  It is easy to see why in both cases Thieu 
saw South Vietnamese security as heavily threatened. 
 Thieu and the GVN also worried that after the agreement had been signed, the 
United States would simply leave South Vietnam unprotected and vulnerable to 
Communist attack both from the North and from within the country.  As such, Thieu was 
extremely reluctant to sign any agreement without guarantees from the United States for 
future protection, or at least large amounts of aid.11  To some extent the United States 
attempted to quell these fears with large shipments—especially of military supplies—like 
the huge “Enhance Plus” operation that occurred shortly before talks were suspended.12  
Still, the GVN worried—in hindsight, with reason—that a peace accord would mean the 
end of American aid to their country. 
 In general, then, the South Vietnamese government had a number of legitimate 
security concerns it wanted addressed before it would consent to signing a peace 
agreement.  As noted above, however, it could only push so far before risking a separate 
peace signed solely by the United States and North Vietnam.  Regardless, it pushed its 
objections hard enough that Kissinger himself commented—as early as October—that “it 
is hard to exaggerate the toughness of Thieu’s position” and that “his demands verge on 
insanity.”13  Further, the lack of a South Vietnamese representative intimately involved in 
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the talks only furthered delay.  It is safe to assume that, had Thieu not raised the 
objections he did at the times he did, an agreement would have been signed by the United 
States and North Vietnam and then presented to Thieu to sign himself.  Instead, as 
discussed below, his objections forced the United States to suggest changes to what the 
North Vietnamese already thought was an agreed-upon peace document—which in turn 
convinced the North that stalling and waiting out the United States Congress would prove 
more fruitful.  In the end, Thieu’s delays and complaints helped to cause a breakdown in 
talks that would be the impetus for the Linebacker II bombings—even though, after the 
bombing, the agreement remained virtually the same and Thieu had no choice but to sign 
it. 
 
The United States: Peace with Honor 
Upon the stalling of the Paris peace talks in the middle of December, the United States 
attempted to put the blame for the breakdown solely on the North Vietnamese.14  In 
reality, however, the United States was perhaps the main contributor to the breakdown of 
the talks due to domestic political concerns, a lack of clear overall goals, and—most 
importantly—an overly strong desire to placate President Thieu and the South 
Vietnamese government. 
 Throughout the latter stages of the Paris peace talks, the specter of the upcoming 
United States presidential election was lurking in the background.  As the chances for a 
completed agreement increased, Nixon, Kissinger, and other United States diplomats 
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faced the question of whether to sign the agreement before or after the election.15  
Kissinger strongly advised completing the agreement before November, thus honoring 
the deadline of October 31 that he and Tho had set at the beginning of the talks.  
Delaying until after this point meant risking North Vietnamese accusations of stalling.16  
In early October Nixon had agreed, but as the election drew nearer the President 
“concluded that a settlement which takes place before the election…has a high risk of 
severely damaging the US domestic scene” by making it look as if the settlement was 
rushed in order to bolster support before the voting booths opened.17  In the end, Nixon 
and the United States chose to wait until after the presidential election to attempt to 
complete a peace agreement. These delays only served to increase North Vietnamese 
stubbornness and South Vietnamese uneasiness. 
 After the election, Nixon, Kissinger, and other American officials were still 
greatly concerned with South Vietnamese complaints—as discussed above—regarding 
the proposed agreements coming out of the negotiations between Kissinger and Le Duc 
Tho in Paris.  One of the main reasons the United States broke off talks was because the 
South Vietnamese objected to many fundamental aspects of the proposed agreement that 
the North Vietnamese were likewise unwilling to compromise on. These included aspects 
three of the four main objections raised by the South Vietnamese over the agreement—
the fourth, South Vietnam’s worries that the United States would simply abandon it, 
could not be addressed by North Vietnam but only by the United States itself.  To that 
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end, the United States sent a number of envoys to pursuade the South it would not 
abandon it, and also used aid programs like Enhance Plus to signal this commitment as 
well.  To mollify Thieu’s other fears, Kissinger proposed a large number of modifications 
to the informally agreed-upon treaty that had been virtually finalized by October 22 in his 
November 20 meetings with Le Duc Tho.  Some sought to eliminate the third, “neutral” 
party in the tripartite commission—thus destroying the purpose for such a commission to 
begin with.  Kissinger also attempted to limit North Vietnamese troops and their 
movements in South Vietnam, as well as eliminating any specific mentioning of the PRG 
(the rival South Vietnamese Communist government) in the agreement. Other changes 
included post-agreement elections for both South and North Vietnam, speeding up the 
cease-fire process in Cambodia and Laos, and eliminating lower-level administrative 
elections that could have been used to put communist officials in power.18  Clearly, these 
demands were tied directly to the complaints of Thieu and South Vietnam discussed in 
the previous section and were attempts to make it feel it had a voice in the negotiations—
thus increasing the chances Thieu and his government would sign on to the threaty when 
it was finalized.  Still, presenting all Thieu’s desired changes at once was a “major 
tactical mistake,” as even Kissinger himself would come to realize in the future.19  To 
somewhat make up for this “mistake”, Kissinger removed some of the more minor of 
Thieu’s demands from the table—but stuck by some of the most important. By the end of 
November 22 the United States’ list of new demands included: 
Clearing up the translation of the phrase “administrative structure” to 
describe the National Council [i.e. the tripartite commission]; 
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strengthening the provisions on respect for the DMZ; [and] finding some 
solution to the problem of North Vietnamese forces in the South. 
 
Tho—while willing to accept some cosmetic changes, including the language of what 
weapons could be replaced by the United States on behalf of the South Vietnamese—
refused to consider these major provisions, as they had already been informally agreed to 
in October. From there, the talks devolved to the point where each side was asking for a 
myriad of new changes and concessions. 20 
 If the United States had taken a harder stance against South Vietnam, however, 
and threatened to sign a unilateral agreement with the North Vietnamese, it is highly 
likely Thieu and his government would have eventually agreed to the peace accords even 
if they were not ideal, since their choice would be between signing or being abandoned 
by the United States completely.  Kissinger admits as much in his memoirs when he 
writes, “We failed early enough to grasp that Thieu’s real objection was not to the terms 
but the fact of any compromise.  Conflict between us and Thieu was built into the 
termination of the war on any terms less than Hanoi’s total surrender.”21  Indeed, the 
United States did take a harder stance against South Vietnam, which quickly gave in and 
agreed to sign an agreement that did not fulfill close to all of its desires—but only after 
the bombing campaign had run its course.  It is clear with hindsight that taking this path 
would have saved lives, money, and precious time for the United States. 
 More abstractly, Nixon was often ambivalent about United States goals at the 
peace talks.  A peace agreement ending the war was the ultimate target, but Nixon also 
wanted to “humiliate” the North Vietnamese—on the battlefield, in the negotiating room, 
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or both—to show the world that the United States had not been forced to end the war on 
less than ideal terms.  As Robert Schulzinger points out, however, “the goal was 
impossible, given the patience of the North and Nixon’s own acknowledgement that 
Vietnam no longer mattered that much either to the US public or to US foreign policy.”22  
By waffling on just how to extract itself from the Vietnam conflict, therefore, the United 
States helped to extend and enhance the issues emerging from both North and South 
Vietnam that would ultimately derail the peace talks. 
 
North Vietnam: Delay and Wedge 
North Vietnam, although in the beginning truly bargaining to end the war, slowly became 
fed up with increasing United States demands and attempted to put pressure on the 
United States in order to reach a conclusion of some kind.  The North Vietnamese first 
put pressure on the United States by releasing the text of the proposed agreement on 
October 26. This was due largely to North Vietnamese anger over United States stalling, 
which, as noted above, was due in large part to the wishes of Nixon that an agreement not 
be signed until after the election.  Further, North Vietnam indicated that the agreement 
was close to being signed and implied that the United States had assured North Vietnam 
it would sign the treaty before the month was out. 23  These North Vietnamese tactics 
cleverly put the onus on the United States to sign the agreement quickly or face hard 
questions both domestically and among their international allies.  As John Smith notes, 
“The peace talks were viewed [by the North Vietnamese] as part of a propaganda 
offensive against the Americans.”  Smith goes on to note that “the North Vietnamese had 
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no intention of negotiating anything that would prevent them from achieving their long-
term goals.”24  This was especially true once the United States began introducing new 
demands in November.  
 In October, as has been seen, the North Vietnamese were more than willing to 
negotiate in good faith to find a peace agreement that could be accepted by all.  By 
December of 1972, however, the North Vietnamese had dramatically switched a 
negotiating tactic of giving in on some areas, but then bringing up other areas that had, 
from the American perspective, already been decided.  As Kissinger explained in his 
press conference announcing the halt of peace talks, “The negotiations have had the 
character where a settlement was always just within our reach, and was always pulled just 
beyond our reach when we attempted to grasp it.”25  Why did the North Vietnamese make 
such a switch from good-faith bargaining to active intransigence?  As mentioned above, 
this change in tactics was largely due to the demands put on the table by Kissinger on 
behalf of Thieu in late November.  Tho saw these demands as betraying the implicit 
agreement the two parties had agreed to in October and decided to raise demands of his 
own in response. 
 In the words of Marshall Michel, North Vietnam “was willing to continue the war 
rather than yield on Nixon’s new points.”26  As such, it began to pull back from some 
previously agreed upon points, including “a change on civilian prisoners” as well as a 
demand asking for “the withdrawal of American civilians from South Vietnam, thus 
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making the maintenance of the [South] Vietnam air force impossible.”27  These new 
demands and changes, it seems, were not serious on the part of the North Vietnamese but 
instead retaliation for the delays and new demands put in place by the United States.  
Further, these new demands were a signal to Kissinger and his negotiating partners that 
North Vietnam was willing to stall negotiations until Congress reconvened if that was 
necessary to getting an acceptable agreement. 
 In effect, Le Duc Tho and the North were giving Kissinger and the United States 
three choices: they could give up on South Vietnamese demands and return to the 
October 22 agreement; they could continue fruitlessly negotiating with the South 
Vietnamese demands still in place, thus paving the way for Congress to cut off funding in 
January, or they could halt the talks in favor of a compellence strategy centered on 
bombing.  No matter what course the United States took, North Vietnam believed in 
would win out in the end.  If Kissinger agreed to jettison the South Vietnamese 
demands—as, eventually, he implicitly did—the North would be left with a satisfactory 
agreement.  If Kissinger continued to push the South Vietnamese demands, the North 
could stall until the United States Congress forced a stoppage of hostilities.  Finally, the 
North believed—correctly, as it turned out—that it could withstand a bombing campaign 
carried out by the United States and come out stronger on the other side.28  
 Who then bears the brunt of the responsibility for letting the Paris peace talks die? 
As might be expected, most in Nixon’s administration saw both the North and South as 
overly intransigent and petty, and the delays each side created were blamed for the 
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temporary failure of the peace talks.  “Both the North and South Vietnamese must share 
responsibility for the delay in reaching a settlement,” Nixon wrote to Kissinger.  “Each 
side wants to gain advantages at the peace table it has not and cannot gain on the 
battlefield.”29  This analysis, while not altogether incorrect, is an easy one to make from 
halfway across the world.  For both North and South Vietnam, their direct security was at 
stake, and both were clearly willing to do whatever necessary to survive, even if that 
meant, paradoxically, extending the war. 
 Many of the scholars that wrote about the war shortly after it ended placed the 
blame for the failure of the talks on Nixon and the United States, and argued that he 
should not have waited until after the November elections to make a firm commitment to 
signing, or that he was too easy on Thieu and the GVN.30  This argument, too, has some 
merits, most notably the idea that if Nixon had pressed harder on Thieu to revoke many 
of his complaints before initiating the bombings, Thieu would eventually have 
capitulated, as he did a month later after the talks resumed. 
 The initiation of the Linebacker II bombings, then, can largely be explained as a 
consequence of the strained relationship between the United States and South Vietnam.  
South Vietnam distrusted its ally enough to fervently push for unrealistic concessions, 
while the United States failed to convince South Vietnam to do otherwise.  All North 
Vietnam had to do was sit back and let the two allies bicker while it waited it out at the 
negotiating table—simply stalling until the United States signed a separate peace.  The 
Linebacker II bombings, then, were America’s attempt to change North Vietnam’s 
position from observer to active participant.
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Chapter 3:  Capability 
 
The most obvious aspect of any compellence strategy is the ability of the compelling state 
to possess the requisite capabilities to successfully change the actions of the state it is 
trying to compel.  On the surface, this seems a fairly easy analysis to make: the compeller 
either does or does not have the capabilities required.  In reality, however, the issue of 
capabilities is much more complex.  Just because a state has more capability overall, for 
example, does not mean it will be able to bring those capabilities to bear in any given 
situation.  Thus, in many compellence examples it is only a certain type of capability that 
matters.1  In the case of the Linebacker II bombings, this section of capability is air 
power.  
 It is obvious, even without any prior knowledge of the situation, that the United 
States Air Forces had a huge advantage over North Vietnam anti-air defenses.  In this 
sense American forces had a distinct capability advantage over their opponent.  The main 
threat of the Linebacker II bombings, however, was not that the United States would 
conduct one massive strike on Hanoi or Haiphong but instead keep up the bombing 
indefinitely until North Vietnam began to once again negotiate in good faith.  This meant 
that the United States not only had to possess a clear advantage in the skies, but also the 
ability to maintain this advantage indefinitely. 
 The notion of how long the United States could keep up bombing was clearly 
worrisome for Nixon and his aides.  Alexander Haig—then a military adviser to 
Kissinger and Nixon in Vietnam—worried that the bombings would “be tough [on the 
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North Vietnamese] initially, but I don’t think we’re going to be able to keep it up.”2  
Even after the bombing had begun, Nixon himself worried that the North Vietnamese 
would hold out to the point where the United States would have no choice but to agree to 
a total withdrawal in exchange solely for return of American POWs, with no peace 
agreement in place.3  Military leaders directing the bombing runs also possessed worries 
about an unending bombing campaign.  Besides the obvious concerns over losing men 
and materiel, leaders also fretted over the possibility of upsetting the Chinese.  “During 
missions near the Chinese border,” a former general remarks, “an inadvertent violation of 
the border could readily happen.”4  
 These legitimate concerns about the longevity of the bombing were not enough, in 
the end, to change Nixon’s tactics.  For many in Nixon’s administration, a compellence 
strategy centered on bombing was viewed as the only remaining way forward.  One 
American official noted, “Hanoi had refused to negotiate seriously by December, and the 
bombing was the only means we had left to get the negotiations going again.”5  Kissinger 
echoes this sentiment in his memoirs when he writes, “We had only two choices: taking a 
massive, shocking step to impose our will on events and end the war quickly, or letting 
matters drift into another round of inconclusive negotiations…and mounting casualties.  
There were no other options.”6  Likewise, at the conclusion of the bombings, Kissinger 
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reiterated to Nixon in a telephone conversation that “no other method” could have 
achieved the same results in the same amount of time.7    
 What these planners did not anticipate, however, was the failure of the North 
Vietnamese to capitulate.  Indeed, “North Vietnamese morale did not break in any major 
way,” and “even after the heavy bombing the will of the Northern leadership had not 
been broken.  It seemed to be prepared to accept further bombing rather than give way to 
the Americans.”8 Many North Vietnamese officials and civilians began calling the 
bombing campaign “Twelve Days of Dienbienphu in the Air,” harkening back to their 
landmark victory against the French almost two decades earlier.  Once it became clear 
that bombing, while affecting the fighting capability of the North Vietnamese, would do 
little to affect their morale, Nixon and Kissinger sought to resume talks in Paris as soon 
as possible. 9 
 Another reason the United States changed course and began advocating for a 
return to the negotiating table was the threat of increased losses of B-52 bombers.  The B-
52s that would take part in the Linebacker II bombings were flying over arguably the 
most heavily defended area in the world,10 and Nixon’s chief of staff H.R. Haldeman 
makes clear the President greatly worried that many would be lost.  “The P[resident] kept 
coming back to the B-52 loss problem,” Haldeman writes, “saying we can’t back off, but 
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will we get three losses every time?  If so, it’s going to be very tough to take.”11  Nixon, 
in his own memoirs, goes so far as to label B-52 losses, not domestic and international 
criticism, as his “major concern.”12  Indeed, as Mark Clodfelter points out, “a heavy loss 
of B-52s…would create the antithesis of the psychological impact that Nixon desired.”13  
Despite these concerns, the bombing campaign saw relatively few losses—except for one 
deadly day when 6 B-52s were shot down.14  Still, the fear of increased casualties on the 
part of Nixon and the United States only furthered their willingness to break off bombing 
and return to negotiations.   
 Why did the Linebacker II bombing raids fail to significantly affect Vietnamese 
morale?  One argument would be that the United States focused too heavily on hitting 
military targets and not enough on hitting civilian ones.  In any bombing campaign, the 
bombing country has basically two choices: to focus on targets they deem militarily 
valuable to the enemy—like bases, SAM sites, roads, etc.—or to focus on civilian targets 
to cause terror and, theoretically, to lessen morale. Given the factual record and accounts 
by the principal planners, it is clear the Linebacker II campaign was almost solely 
devoted to hitting targets that held military value.  Robert Schulzinger describes how the 
main targets of the bombing campaign were “bridges, power plants, railroad lines, and 
industrial installations.”15  In other words, the main targets were infrastructural, not 
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civilian.  While hitting these targets would of course have a detrimental effect on the lives 
of civilians in the area, this was not the primary concern of United States planners. 
 Undeniably, civilians were killed—over 1,000 of them, in fact.16  But when 
American planners did bring up the issue of civilians, it was almost always to warn 
against killing them.  This general mindset of avoiding civilian casualties can be seen 
from the highest levels of government in the United States down to the bomber pilots 
themselves.  During the planning phases of the war, Nixon himself advised Admiral 
Moorer—the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—to hit as many targets as possible, 
but “without taking out too much civilian stuff.”17  The orders clearly made their way 
down the chain of command, with one Air Force planner observing that “we were not 
allowed to bomb many targets much more lucrative because of [possible] civilian 
casualties.”18  The actual order of strike targets cabled to military leaders in Vietnam and 
in the air bases that would participate in the attacks likewise specifically mentions that 
“necessary precautions [should] be taken to minimize the risk of civilian casualties.”19  A 
witness to the briefings given to the bomber crews shortly before the attacks began made 
it even clearer that civilian casualties were to be limited.  “The instructions to the 
[navigators] were that if they were not 100 percent sure of their aiming point, ‘then don’t 
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drop; bring the bombs back.’”20  At all levels, then, it could not be clearer that avoiding 
civilian casualties was high on the list of priorities.  An argument could thus be made 
that, had the United States instead focused on targeting civilian areas, North Vietnamese 
morale would have been more greatly affected. 
 Of course, there are major problems with targeting civilian centers as well.  As 
Robert Pape points out, these attempts to “manipulate civilian vulnerability” often do 
little to lessen morale and in many cases actually strengthen the enemy’s resolve among 
both civilians and military personnel alike.21  This is one of the main reasons, scholars 
like Robert Jervis and Benjamin Lambeth argue, why Lyndon Johnson’s air campaigns 
earlier in the war—targeted as they were against civilians and guerilla fighters who were 
easily able to hide in the jungle—were mostly failures.22  The terror bombings of major 
cities like Tokyo, London, and Dresden in World War II are further examples of civilian 
targeting that actually hardened morale among the target populace. There is little doubt 
that a bombing campaign aimed at North Vietnamese civilians would have done the 
same.   
 Indeed, the United States did obliquely try to affect the morale of the North 
Vietnamese. In general, the goal was to avoid actual civilian deaths while simultaneously 
creating explosions and reverberations that would disorient and scare both average 
civilians in Hanoi and Haiphong as well as members of the North Vietnamese leadership.  
                                                
20 McCarthy, A View from the Rock, 50. 
21 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1996), 209.  For a more detailed account of World War II “punishment” strategies aimed at 
demoralizing civilians, see ibid., 59-66. 
22 Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2000), 52.  Lambeth quotes Jervis’ remarks that “the American conventional offensives that worked 
well when the North Vietnamese thought they could win by large-scale battles failed when the latter 
reverted to guerilla warfare.” 
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Admiral Moorer summed up this strategy when commenting, “I want the people of Hanoi 
to hear the bombs…but minimize damage to the civilian populace.”23  Nixon, too, noted 
that “the [B-52s] will shake them, won’t [they]?” with Kissinger smugly noting that the 
bombing would “break every window in Hanoi.”24  Further, the sheer number of missions 
was designed not only to hit as many targets as possible in a short time, but also to awe 
the Vietnamese into submission.25  As might have been expected given historical 
precedent, the bombing actually helped strengthen, not weaken, North Vietnamese 
morale.  Marshall Michel describes how “the bombing served to unify a population that 
was beginning to chafe under years of unending war, because this battle was not fought 
on some distant battlefield but in the hear of the country.”26 Pape, too, argues that “there 
was no general panic” and that “none of the available evidence suggests that civilian 
vulnerability contributed” to a return to negotiations.27  Again, given historical examples 
like the ones mentioned above, it is likely the morale of Vietnamese civilians would have 
been hardened all the more if the United States had sought to directly attack civilians 
instead of indirectly attempting to scare them. 
 Further, directly attacking civilian targets would have spelled doom for Nixon and 
Kissinger domestically.  Nixon already was faced with a dovish Congress that would 
likely vote to suspend funding for the war once it began its session in January.  Even in 
the actual case, when Nixon attacked mainly military targets, many Congressmen 
lambasted the bombing, calling it “disastrous” and insisting that “this should outrage the 
                                                
23 Quoted in Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 184. 
24 Nixon White House Tapes, Tape 34 (White House Telephone), Conversation 114, accessed at 
<http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/tape034/tape034.php>, 20 January 2010. 
25 See Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 196-197. 
26 Marshall L. Michel III, The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle (San Francisco: 
Encounter Books, 2002), 233. 
27 Pape, Bombing to Win, 209. 
 39 
conscience of all Americans.”   Likewise, newspapers as renowned as the New York 
Times and the Washington Post described the bombing with editorials like “Terror from 
the Skies” and “Terror Bombing in The Name of Peace.”28  Had Nixon actually gone 
after civilians, the outcry would have been even worse than it was, and Congress would 
have grown even more determined to end the way by any means at their disposal. 
 Clearly, then, a bombing campaign targeted at civilians was not a viable option 
for Nixon.  Yet what actually happened shows that targeting military aspects of North 
Vietnam was likewise ineffective in affecting North Vietnamese morale.  Thus, the only 
conclusion to be drawn is that the capabilities used by the United States in this instance—
i.e., bombers—were not appropriate for their compellence goal of getting the North 
Vietnamese to accept the changes proposed by Kissinger on behalf of Thieu and the 
South Vietnamese.  Going further, it is questionable whether the United States had any 
capability to affect North Vietnam short of nuclear weapons.  As noted, bombing could 
not succeed, and a ground offensive was unlikely as well given both the tactics employed 
by Communist Vietnamese fighters as well as domestic resistance to increased American 
casualties.  A nuclear weapon drop may have been effective—as it was with Japan in 
1945—but given the global ramifications of such an event a bombing of this kind was 
more or less completely off the table as well.  In sum, the United States simply did not 
possess the requisite capabilities to affect North Vietnam in the manner they wished, but 
nonetheless tried a bombing campaign that only hardened the morale in the North while 
angering critics at home.  
                                                
28 Kissinger, White House Years, 1453. 
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Chapter 4:  Credibility 
 
 
Another important facet of compellence is the maintenance—and in many cases 
heightening—of the compelling state’s credibility.  At a basic level, this means the 
compelling state must seek to convince its adversary that it will either carry through its 
threats or—if the compellence takes the form of actual force—that the use of that force 
will be sustained until the adversary changes its behavior in a way that suits the wishes of 
the compeller.  Of course, no interactions between states take place in a vacuum, so often 
the compelling state and the target of compellence must both weigh how their choices 
will affect their overall credibility in their region and throughout the world.  Certainly, 
this was the case during the Linebacker II bombings, when both North Vietnam and 
especially the United States not only sought to bolster their credibility with each other, 
but also had to factor in the repercussions their actions would cause among both allies 
and enemies across the world. 
 The Linebacker II bombing campaign was, in fact, a way for the United States to 
uphold its credibility with North Vietnam and thus make its coercive diplomacy effective.  
As discussed above, Le Duc Tho and the North Vietnamese negotiators were clearly 
stalling by December of 1972, and in the view of Kissinger and other negotiators in Paris 
were attempting to call the United States’ bluff—hoping they would not have the political 
support necessary to engage in another bombing campaign like the first Linebacker 
bombings, which the United States had initiated earlier in the year, and instead sign a 
separate peace, thus leaving South Vietnam especially vulnerable to a later North 
 41 
Vietnamese invasion.1  In this way, North Vietnam was challenging the credibility of the 
United States, and a response was called for to avoid losing face—both in terms of 
negotiating position once talked resumed as well as in terms of America’s credibility on 
the world stage for any potential future conflicts. Further, the United States had to deal 
with how coercive diplomacy would affect its specific allies—like South Vietnam and 
other pro-American states in the region such as Thailand—as well as its enemies, notably 
Russia, China, and North Vietnam itself. 
 Most importantly, Nixon and the United States had to retain credibility with North 
Vietnam.  Previously, Nixon had rejected earlier drafts of the agreement due to 
complaints from Thieu, and returning to these agreements now would make the United 
States appear weak and vacillating, as well as angering their South Vietnamese allies.  
The North Vietnamese leadership was excellent at sensing weakness at the negotiating 
table, and would become emboldened to push for still more changes that would tilt the 
post-war balance of power between North and South Vietnam in the favor of the 
Communists.2 
 The target selection for the Linebacker II bombings was also largely due to 
concerns about American credibility vis-à-vis the North Vietnamese going forward.  
Besides being militarily valuable targets, Hanoi and Haiphong were major population 
centers and had long been off limits to American bombers.  As noted above in Chapter 3, 
                                                
1 See Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1979), 1430.  Late in the 
negotiations, Kissinger sent a message to Nixon noting that the North Vietnamese were “gambling on [the 
United States’] unwillingness to do what is necessary,” i.e. begin another bombing campaign. 
2 Although not specifically referring to any country, Kissinger made these credibility concerns clear in a 
phone call to Nixon, when he noted that the only other alternative to bombing, going back to one of the 
October agreements, would make the United States appear “impotent.”  Nixon White House Tapes, Tape 
34 (White House Telephone), Conversation 114, accessed at 
<http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/tape034/tape034.php>, 25 January 2010. 
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B-52 targets were solely military, but a large aspect of the bombing was the effect it 
would supposedly have on North Vietnamese morale—not by killing civilians outright, 
but instead by scaring them and the North Vietnamese government into capitulating.  By 
attacking these cities, Nixon was showing he “was not to be trifled with,” as Kissinger 
put it to Nixon during one of their many phone conversations during this period.3  Nixon 
himself alluded to similar ideas when he wrote to Kissinger, “If we renew the bombing, it 
will have to be something new, and that means we will have to make the big decision to 
hit Hanoi and Haiphong with B-52s.  Anything less will only make the enemy 
contemptuous.”4  In both cases, Kissinger and Nixon realized a small-scale attack would 
not only fail to achieve their compellence goals, but would also embolden the North 
Vietnamese in the future to try further stalling tactics and other measures to increase their 
share of any eventual settlement.  From the American point of view, a line had to be 
drawn to avoid risking loss of credibility both at the time and down the road. 
 Interestingly, although the Linebacker II bombings were initiated largely to save 
the credibility of the United States, once they had begun the United States’ credibility 
was on the line again.  This time, the issue was whether or not the North Vietnamese 
could withstand the bombings long enough for the United States to give up, either due to 
lack of support from Congress at home or to unacceptable bomber losses from 
Vietnamese anti-air and SAM fire.  While outwardly the United States never considered 
ending the Linebacker II bombings early, in actuality the situation was much more tense.  
As discussed in the previous section, Nixon and some of his aides were quite concerned 
over the loss of B-52s and how long they could keep up the high volume of bombing 
                                                
3 Nixon White House Tapes, Tape 35 (White House Telephone), Conversation 19, accessed at 
<http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/tape035/tape035.php>, 25 January 2010. 
4 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 734. 
 43 
runs.  At the same time, Nixon “remained just as anxious to demonstrate his own icy 
resolution,” as Robert Schulzinger points out.5  Still, once it became clear that the North 
Vietnamese were willing to wait out the United States, even though they had exhausted 
almost all of their ammunition for both anti-air artillery and SAM sites, he had no choice 
but to advocate for a return to negotiations.6  Largely, however, the United States was 
able to paint the return to the talks as a North Vietnamese concession, and could point to 
the levels of destruction on the ground as evidence—even though, as discussed earlier, 
North Vietnamese morale did not break. The lesson for those choosing a compellence 
strategy is thus that a compelling state must factor in the potential credibility gains or 
losses if they were to attempt to compel and fail, as well as if they simply avoided 
compellence altogether.  It is likely that in many instances not compelling at all would 
actually cause less of a credibility loss than attempting to compel and failing. 
 As has been shown, credibility factored into American strategizing both before 
and during their compellence action.  Credibility concerns did not stop here, however.  
Even after the United States returned to the negotiating table, it continued bombing at a 
reduced level below the 20th parallel—i.e. in the more traditional areas the American 
military had been bombing since the beginning of hostilities.7  While in theory this 
allowed the threat of yet another large-scale bombing campaign to hang over the resumed 
negotiations in the case of more North Vietnamese intransigence, the fact that the 
Americans had returned to the table without directly affecting North Vietnamese morale 
                                                
5 Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 302. 
6 Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 
1978), 254. 
7 Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: The 
Free Press, 1989), 199. 
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was a clear signal that they had no intention of resuming bombing on the scale of 
Linebacker II.   
 Of course, many both at the time and in retrospect have argued that the massive 
bombing campaign affected the following round of peace talks.  In the words of one 
American negotiator, “The threat of renewed and effective bombing…was implied in all 
that we signed with Hanoi.”  Likewise, Henry Kissinger suggested that by ordering 
Linebacker II and then maintaining a lower—but still intense—level of bombing, Nixon 
was “making the peace enforceable.”8  If this was true, however, the United States would 
have pressed for much more sweeping changes than the small, cosmetic ones they were 
able to secure.  Indeed, some students of the Vietnam War argue the United States did in 
fact have more credibility in the eyes of the North Vietnamese then the Americans 
themselves realized.  Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, a retired admiral, argues that “the terms of 
the peace settlement were much less than what could have been achieved had we 
[explicitly] threatened with a resumption of bombing on the scale used in those eleven 
days.”9  On the other hand, scholars like Robert Pape argue that while “Linebacker 
II…damaged the North’s ability to carry it out its conventional military strategy for 
overrunning the [South Vietnamese army]…it did not seriously impair its ability to 
defend already-held territories.”10  Further, the bombing did not damage the North’s 
morale, either—meaning the North was ready for more bombing if necessary.  The 
argument that the threat of renewed bombing was important in the negotiations is 
defeated simply by the fact that the United States was the actor that first made overtures 
                                                
8 Nixon White House Tapes, Tape 34 (White House Telephone), Conversation 114, accessed at 
<http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/tape034/tape034.php>, 25 January 2010. 
9 Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, 255. 
10 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1996), 205. 
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to resume talks and, once at the table, did not push for any but the most cosmetic of 
concessions.  As a US diplomat wryly put it: “We bombed the North Vietnamese into 
accepting our concession.”11   
 In general, compellence strategies must take into account this notion: that the 
adversary faces similar credibility concerns to the compeller.  This idea—discussed in 
more detail in the following section—means that compelling states must at least to some 
degree factor in the credibility concerns of their adversary to avoid a situation where the 
adversary “would never…accept the international loss of face” associated with giving in 
to compellence, and as a result would become even more intransigent than before.12  
Even in the Linebacker II case, where the United States made a number of attempts to 
help North Vietnam accept the United States’ demands without appearing weak, the 
North still sought to bolster its credibility vis-à-vis the United States.  Allan Goodman 
points out that “North Vietnamese accounts of the final days leading to the Paris 
Agreement stress that it was Washington, not Hanoi, that had to be persuaded to return to 
the October draft.”13  This example illustrates how it is important for a compeller to 
realize that both sides have credibility concerns that must be addressed to at least some 
degree. 
 Obviously, a compelling state must factor in both the credibility of its threats and 
how its credibility will be affected by its compellence strategy, regardless of whether it 
                                                
11 Jeffrey P. Kimball, “’Peace with Honor’: Richard Nixon and the Diplomacy of Threat and Symbolism,” 
in David L. Anderson, ed., Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975 
(Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 176. 
12 Nixon, Memoirs, 736.  See also Kissinger, White House Years, 1449.  As noted in the text, see the 
“Clarity of Demands” section of this paper for more detail on just how the United States sought to ease the 
North’s acceptance of its demands. 
13 Allen E. Goodman, The Lost Peace: America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War 
(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 161. 
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fails or succeeds.  However, these considerations are never limited to simply what its 
compellence target thinks and will think of it.  A state can also use a compellence 
strategy to affect its credibility in the eyes of third parties, whether ally or enemy.  On the 
other hand, a failed compellence strategy can hurt its credibility with these parties, so 
extra care must be taken.  
 In the case of Linebacker II, the United States had to consider many different 
audiences.  In terms of its adversaries, the United States was mainly focused, of course, 
on North Vietnam, but the impact of the bombing campaign on China and the Soviet 
Union—basically North Vietnam’s benefactors—was also an issue.  In the period shortly 
after the bombing, many critics of Nixon argued that the Linebacker II campaign had 
failed to plan for the fact that China and the Soviet Union would take this as a sign of 
unnecessary American aggression and treat America as such—exactly what Nixon was 
trying to avoid with his policies of détente.14  Behind the scenes, however, the United 
States was ensuring that China and the Soviet Union would not change their view of the 
United States due to the bombing.  The State Department conducted personal meetings 
with the Chinese behind the scenes to explain their rationale for cutting off talks, and 
Kissinger instructed his aides in Washington to contact Soviet officials and do the same.15  
In both cases, the United States showed little concern over the reaction from the two 
countries, given that intelligence had shown they were already pressuring North Vietnam 
                                                
14 For example, see Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1975), 
163. 
15 For text of the Chinese meeting, see Steven E. Phillips and Edward C. Keefer, eds., Foreign Relations 
1969-1976 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), Vol. XVII (China, 1969-
1972), 1126-1132.  For a description of the State Department’s actions regarding the Soviet Union, see 
Kissinger, White House Years, 1429. 
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to end the war as soon as possible.16  While it is true that both China and the Soviet 
Union publicly condemned the Linebacker II bombings, it is fairly clear that these actions 
were designed mostly to protect their own credibility with their allies, instead of 
legitimate criticisms of American tactics. 
 The United States also had to worry about its credibility in the eyes of its allies.  
Although it was not trying to directly influence its allies through compellence, it did have 
to take the effects of its compellence on allied countries into consideration.  Those allies 
in Europe—the countries of NATO—were some of the most vociferous in their criticism 
of the bombing, but what was left unsaid was that the United States was still the sole 
protector of those countries against the Soviet Union and, as such, the NATO countries 
could talk as much as they wanted but would never carry out any major actions that went 
against the will of the United States.17 
 More important in the eyes of the leaders of the United States was the reaction of 
its allies in the region—and this reaction, at least according to American officials, was 
almost solely positive.  In the words of Henry Kissinger, “The countries that had 
contributed troops to our effort, like Thailand and South Korea, applauded; those in the 
direct line of Communist advance, like Indonesia and Malaysia, expressed no opposition 
to our action publicly, while supporting it privately.”18  These countries, which relied 
upon the United States for their preservation, saw the bombing as reassurance that 
American power could be called upon when they were threatened.  As Kissinger 
remarked to Nixon, the bombing helped to “shore up the courage of others in the 
                                                
16 Nixon White House Tapes, Tape 34 (White House Telephone), Conversation 114, accessed at 
<http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/tape034/tape034.php>, 25 January 2010. 
17 See Kissinger, White House Years, 1453-1454. 
18 Ibid., 1454. 
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region.”19  Of course, American allies were in for a rude shock when the United States 
removed itself entirely from Southeast Asia and the Communists conquered all of 
Vietnam, but the bombing itself only helped to strengthen American credibility in the 
eyes of its allies in the region.  Still, while this reaction was helpful to United States 
interests in the region, it is clear this was only an effect of the Linebacker II bombings 
and by no means a goal. 
 The effect of the Linebacker II bombings to the credibility of the United States in 
the eyes of the South Vietnamese presents a special case.  A number of scholars have 
argued that the central purpose of the Linebacker II bombings was to increase credibility 
with the South Vietnamese by reassuring them that American power was still able to 
protect them.20  The facts of the situation, however, simply do not support this claim.  In 
fact, by the end of 1972, Kissinger was referring to Thieu, the leader of South Vietnam, 
as “a complete SOB” and “this idiot in Saigon.”21  Because of Thieu’s stubbornness—
discussed in more detail above—the United States had reached a point where they 
considered signing a separate peace with the North Vietnamese.  Clearly, then, reassuring 
South Vietnam was at most only a secondary objective, since they were considering 
going on without them anyway. 
 Although the reassurance of the South Vietnamese was by no means the main 
goal of the Linebacker II bombing, it did provide this reassurance as a secondary effect.  
Mark Clodfelter describes how “Linebacker II gave credibility to both the promise of 
                                                
19 Nixon White House Tapes, Tape 34 (White House Telephone), Conversation 114, accessed at 
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continued American support and Nixon’s willingness to use air power to uphold an 
agreement.”  In general, the bombings helped give Thieu the assurance he needed to sign 
on to the peace agreement crafted by the United States and North Vietnam; even though 
he almost certainly would have done so anyway—his country could not function without 
American aid—the safety blanket of the bombings helped to convince him and his 
cohorts that intransigence over the peace treaty was not necessary.22 
 Thus credibility was an issue at all stages of the Linebacker II bombings: in the 
decision to begin the bombings, during the attacks themselves, and after the fact going 
forward into renewed negotiations.  The decision to bomb was largely made to protect 
American credibility, and during the bombings American credibility was at stake if the 
North Vietnamese held out. So, from a credibility standpoint, was the Linebacker II 
bombing campaign a success?  Overall the answer is no.  While the United States’ 
credibility was arguably enhanced vis-à-vis its allies in the region, it actually lost 
credibility in the eyes of its main target, North Vietnam.  In essence, the United States 
had shown to the North that it lacked the commitment necessary to exact the substantial 
concessions demanded by the South, thus weakening, not strengthening, its overall 
credibility and its bargaining position at the peace table.  Further, while this loss of 
credibility was never explicitly admitted by Kissinger or other members of the 
negotiating team, it was implicitly signaled by the fact that the United States sought only 
minor concessions upon their return to Paris in January of 1973—instead of the major 
ones they had sought beforehand.   
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Chapter 5:  Clarity of Goals 
 
 
A third area of importance when analyzing compellence strategies is how well the 
compelling actor conveys its goals to the group it is attempting to compel.  As noted 
previously, the most obvious way these goals are presented is through what Alexander 
George calls a “tacit ultimatum:” a clearly stipulated demand, a time limit for that 
demand to be acceded to, and a threat or actual use of force to convince the actor that 
giving in to the compeller’s demands is the best option from a cost-benefit standpoint.1  
Of course, in the real world the demands of compellers are often more obscured.  This 
can happen for in number of instances, writes Gary Schaub Jr.  For one, a compeller can 
choose to obfuscate to at least some degree its compellence goals because the compeller 
itself is unsure of just what is a sufficient action for the rival state to take.  In other 
scenarios, a compelling country might make its goals more vague to help the adversary 
state avoid a major loss of prestige, thus reducing costs of acceding to the state’s 
compellence.2  Regardless, the ability of a compelling state to in some way make its goals 
known to the state it is attempting to compel is crucial.  If the target state does not know 
what it is supposed to do, no amount of force or international pressure can cause it to act 
in the way desired by the compelling state. 
 As such, any analysis of Nixon’s compellence strategies must take into account 
the United States’ ability to successfully convey its demands in a way that would get the 
point across while avoiding backing the North Vietnamese into a situation where they 
would have no choice but to hold out.  In other words, Nixon had to both convey what 
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would be viewed as acceptable on the part of the North Vietnamese and ensure that they 
would be able to comply without overly damaging their international position.  It is safe 
to say that in both these areas Nixon and the United States were successful. 
 The first step for Nixon and his administration was to make sure that the North 
Vietnamese knew what was expected of them, and what the price would be if they failed 
to meet those expectations in the eyes of the United States.  As Gareth Porter points out, 
“since the beginning of 1969 Richard Nixon had used the threat of unprecedented 
destruction of North Vietnam for a variety of purposes.”3  Indeed, in some cases—most 
notably the first Linebacker bombing campaign in the spring of 1972—actual force was 
used as well to compel.  For these reasons, it is safe to assume that the North Vietnamese 
would have realized the Linebacker II bombings of December 1972 were simply yet 
another attempt at compellence.   
 Of course, just knowing that the United States was attempting compellence was 
not enough for North Vietnam—the responsibility was on Nixon and his aides to convey 
why they were attempting compellence and how the North Vietnamese should respond.  
The United States made sure to do this through a number of channels.  The most vital 
method of communication, of course, was direct contact between the United States and 
members of the North Vietnamese government.  By December 14—four days before the 
start of the bombing—the United States “sent a cable to Hanoi warning that grave 
consequences would follow if serious negotiations did not resume within seventy-two 
hours.”4  Of course, it was the United States that had, for all intents and purposes, called 
off the talks, so this message was really more of a final request for the North Vietnamese 
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to give in on some of the South Vietnamese demands.  After this threat of force had 
failed, the United State resorted to actual use of force, once again laying out the peace 
agreement it wanted to the North Vietnamese before the bombings even began.  As 
Henry Kissinger described to Nixon on the morning before the bombing campaign 
started, he had sent a letter to Le Duc Tho advising that “the only way to settle is to go 
back to November 23”—i.e. a proposal that the United States could more easily convince 
the South Vietnamese to sign.5  Of note here is that Kissinger did not suggest going back 
to the October 26 agreement—which would have been acceptable to the North but had 
already been rejected by the Thieu and the South.6  Nixon conveyed the United States’ 
compellence goals more publicly as well.  Ron Ziegler, Nixon’s press secretary, made it 
clear that the campaign would continue “until a settlement is arrived at.”7  Because of the 
past history between the two countries, direct communications from the United States to 
North Vietnam, and more public press conferences from member of Nixon’s 
administration, there is little doubt that Le Duc Tho and his politburo brethren in Hanoi 
did not grasp what was being asked of them in return for a cessation of heavy bombing of 
the Hanoi and Haiphong areas 
 Making sure the enemy understands the demands of compellence, however, is 
only one side of the coin when it comes to successfully conveying demands to an 
adversary.  The other side—making sure the enemy has room to back down without 
losing too much face—is often much harder.  A successful compellence strategy must 
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thus find a balance between negative and positive inducements to change the actions of 
the adversary—what Alexander George calls “the carrot-and-stick approach.”8  Once 
again, the United States was overall quite successful at mixing in positive inducements—
“carrots”—with the more negative “sticks” described above.  As was the case at the 
beginning of the campaign, Nixon, Kissinger, and the United States used a variety of 
channels to convey proposed “carrots” to the North Vietnamese side.  Some of these took 
the form of leaving wiggle room for the North Vietnamese to save face in the 
international system.  For example, only five days after Ziegler’s statement that bombing 
would continue until a settlement was reached, the Nixon administration changed their 
tune slightly, demanding only that Hanoi indicate it was willing to negotiate “in a spirit of 
good will and in a constructive attitude.”9  This change served two purposes: it allowed 
the United States to paint the Linebacker II bombings as a success, while simultaneously 
allowing the North Vietnamese to return to substantive negotiations without seeming to 
completely break under the pressure of the United States’ massive bombing campaign. 
 More direct communications were once again used as well.  In this case, 
Kissinger, in a communiqué to Le Duc Tho himself, proposed ending the bombings 
within 36 hours of a return to substantive negotiations.10  Just as the United States had 
                                                
8 Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy” in The Use of Force: Military Power and International 
Politics, Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.), 74-75. 
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threatened force if negotiations were not resumed earlier, they were now offering to stop 
using force if the North Vietnamese would start once again seriously negotiating a peace 
settlement.  It is this combination of threats and offerings that is vital to successfully 
completing a compellence strategy in a manner benefiting the compelling state.  Put more 
broadly, communication—both directly between parties and indirectly through third 
parties like the press and allies—is absolutely essential when attempting compellence 
and, in this facet at least, the United States and President Nixon succeeded quite readily. 
 This is not to say that the Nixon administration did not suffer communication 
problems during the Christmas bombing period.  Ironically, the area where Nixon and his 
aides stumbled most obviously was in communicating with the groups that should have 
been easiest to communicate with—his own constituents and other allies across the 
world.  Further, it is clear that this lack of clear communication was not an accident but a 
deliberate tactic by Nixon.  H.R. Haldeman, Nixon’s chief of staff, notes in his diary of 
the period that Nixon specifically told Kissinger “to be nonspecific on the details” of the 
bombing campaign when announcing the breakdown of the talks in a national press 
conference.11  This decision seems to have been Nixon’s own, as Kissinger clearly 
opposed the idea of describing in detail the reason for and the timing of the Linebacker II 
bombings.  “Nixon was determined to take himself out of the line of fire,” Kissinger 
writes in his memoirs.  “I was asked to give a low-key briefing of the reasons for the 
                                                                                                                                            
credibility concerns were for Nixon on the world stage.  If Nixon was seen to back down publicly from the 
bombing, the North Vietnamese would have potentially been seen as winners of the compellence standoff. 
11 H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York: G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1994), 556. 
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recessing of the Paris talks; how to be low-key about such a dramatic event was no more 
apparent to me in Washington than it had been in Paris.”12 
 Normally, Nixon’s obfuscation of his true goals to his allies and to the United 
States public would matter little in regards to the actual compellence strategy.  But Nixon 
saw an announcement of United States goals—even in the United States to a domestic 
audience—as having a direct effect on North Vietnam by appearing to be an implicit 
ultimatum that would only strengthen the resolve of the North.  “The President believed,” 
Mark Clodfelter notes, “that such a proclamation would delay talks by appearing as an 
ultimatum and making their resumption a matter of prestige.”13  Nixon himself confirms 
this in his own memoirs, noting that North Vietnamese “national pride and their 
ideological fanaticism would never have allowed them to accept the international loss of 
face involved in caving to such an ultimatum.”14  If Nixon had in fact pursued a course 
that kept all notions of the bombing out of public sight, this rationale would not only 
make sense, but would actually be a wise tactic, acting as a “carrot” to allow the North 
Vietnamese room to maneuver.  Instead, Nixon’s explanations do not coincide with the 
facts of the period.  If Nixon truly wanted to avoid the notion of the United States giving 
an ultimatum to the North Vietnamese, he would not have allowed Ziegler and others in 
his administration to make relatively clear statements—in public—regarding just what 
was expected of the North Vietnamese.  By allowing these statements yet failing to 
succinctly address the rationale behind the bombing, Nixon created a lose-lose situation 
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for himself.  On the one hand, the North Vietnamese were to some extent still losing 
prestige by returning to the negotiating table, thus eliminating any advantage Nixon 
would have gained had he kept the rationale for the bombing completely out of the public 
sphere.  On the other hand, the rationale was obfuscated enough that critics of Nixon, 
both within and without the United States, were able to accuse him of blindly bombing 
with no end in sight.   
 Why would Nixon go down such a seemingly irrational and inconsistent road 
when communicating the rationale for the bombing campaign to his enemies and allies?  
Kissinger suggests lack of will; from his point of view, Nixon wanted to get back to the 
negotiating table no matter what and was willing to suffer domestically to achieve this 
goal.15  Of course, this explanation also fails to explain why Nixon would then allow 
members of his administration to go public—to at least some degree—with his 
expectations regarding a resumption of talks by the North Vietnamese.  It seems far more 
likely, then, that this seemingly irrational course of action was actually made by Nixon 
for larger foreign policy purposes—what became known as “madman” strategy.  As 
discussed earlier, this strategy hinges on the notion that a war could escalate at any time 
due to the seeming irrationality of a leader or administration.  In this instance, then, 
Nixon was sacrificing popularity in his country and among his allies to advance this 
strategy towards both the North Vietnamese and their larger, more important allies like 
Russia and China.  Behind the explicit notion that bombing would severely damage the 
North’s capability to fight was the implicit notion that the longer bombing continued, the 
greater the chances for the relatively contained bombing campaign to spin off into a 
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resumption of all-out hostility leading, perhaps, to a spill-over into other countries as 
well.  Although Nixon remained generally coy about this overarching threat, he did 
remark to the columnist Richard Wilson that the bombing might make the North 
Vietnamese—along with the Russians and Chinese—“think they were dealing with a 
madman and so had better [reach] a settlement before the world was consumed by a 
larger war.”16  Kissinger, too—although never mentioning this strategy in his own 
memoirs—is noted as having suggested “brutal unpredictability” as Nixon’s best 
course.17 
 If this was in fact Nixon’s true intention behind his seemingly inconsistent 
actions, he succeeded on the home front but failed where his strategy mattered most—in 
Vietnam.  Many in the United States did in fact accuse Nixon of behaving irrationally, 
with Senator Saxbe going so far as to say Nixon had “taken leave of his senses.”  
Newspapers, too, inadvertently furthered Nixon’s strategy, detailing how the Linebacker 
II bombings were a “new madness” and “beyond all reason.”18  This outcry and the 
seeming madness behind Nixon’s actions, while eating away at Nixon’s popularity at 
home, did little to make Russia and China more eager to see the Vietnam War settled on a 
basis unfavorable to their ally.  While it true that Kissinger describes how “Hanoi was 
being told by its patrons, [i.e. Russia and China] subtly but unmistakably, to settle,” it is 
also true that this settlement would be one that saw the United States—not North 
Vietnam—abandoning some of their strong concessions they had demanded before the 
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bombing.19  In other words, Russia and China clearly desired an end to the hostilities in 
Southeast Asia, but only with an agreement satisfactory to the North.  Had Russia or 
China truly been cowed by Nixon’s apparent irrationality, they would have pushed North 
Vietnam to settle on any terms, even if that meant humiliation for the North and 
strengthening the South.  Since they did not do this, it is safe to assume they were not 
sufficiently worried by Nixon’s actions to warrant any major detours from their normal 
stances on the war. 
 In a final analysis of Nixon’s communication of the compellence goals of the 
United States’ Linebacker II campaign, it is clear Nixon partially succeeded and partially 
failed.  He was able to discreetly advance a program of first sticks, then carrots that 
allowed North Vietnam to understand what was expected of them while still allowing 
them at least some face-saving measures.  The fact that these measures were largely 
pointless thanks to the United States’ unwillingness to bomb long-term does not change 
the fact that, had the North been sufficiently compelled, it could have accepted 
concessions without appearing overly weak.  On the other hand, Nixon failed to appear 
irrational enough to pressure North Vietnam and its allies to be more conciliatory than 
they otherwise may have been.  Although most scholarly works on this period focus on 
the public outcry against these bombings and Nixon’s handling of how they were 
presented, it is likely Nixon himself was, at least to a certain extent, willing to sacrifice 
popular support to advance his larger madman strategy, both in the short-term and, 
perhaps more importantly, in the long-term.20  Unfortunately, his strategy backfired and 
Nixon was left in a position of sacrificing popular support without gaining anything in 
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return.  In this way, Nixon failed in implementing the “rationality of irrationality” that 
Schelling had theorized about years before.
60 
Conclusion 
Is the Linebacker II bombing campaign an example of successful compellence?  The 
answer is almost completely no.  It did help convince South Vietnam the United States 
was willing to back up its support with air power, although, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
this was at most a secondary concern when planning the bombings.  Looked at from a 
longer perspective, the bombing failed to achieve anything concrete with regards to the 
final Paris Agreement—the central reason the United States had chosen to attempt to 
compel North Vietnam.  The main reason the talks had broken down in the first place was 
that the United States had sought to revise the agreement by working a number of South 
Vietnam’s complaints into the agreement, thus alienating and angering the North 
Vietnamese negotiators.  In a truly successful compellence case, one would expect to see 
the North Vietnamese concede at least some of these points after the bombing was halted.  
In fact, the opposite happened—the United States returned to the position it had held 
before the new demands had been raised.  As noted in Chapter 2, the United States’ 
proposed changes were threefold: ensuring the tripartite commission (NCRC) would be 
structured in a way that would not doom South Vietnam; making the DMZ a neutral 
barrier; and getting North Vietnamese troops out of the South.  The changes actually 
made to the agreement—when there were any—simply did not resolve any of these three 
problems.  The NCRC retained its original three-part formulation (although its title was 
slightly changed), the DMZ continued to be controlled by the North, and Communist 
troops were allowed to remain in the South.  North Vietnam did agree to some minor 
cosmetic concessions, but no more than they would have done in the normal course of 
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negotiation.1  In other words, North Vietnam was never “compelled” to do anything—the 
changes they agreed to in the final peace accords were not due to the American bombing 
campaign but instead to the North’s own desire to end its conflict with the United States. 
 Further, the fact that Nixon, Kissinger, and their aides quickly changed their 
attitude from one demanding a signed agreement before ending the bombing to one that 
simply called for a return to talks suggests that Kissinger and Nixon both realized soon 
after the bombing campaign began that it would not succeed in compelling the North to 
the degree they had hoped.  Neither of them admits this in their memoirs—nor, in fact, do 
they reference this notion of failure in their private phone conversations during the 
period.  Of course, this makes sense: neither would want history to see them as “giving 
up,” and even that the time the two were engaged in something of a political struggle for 
power—one in which neither would have wanted to suggest defeat.  Instead, their subtle 
but definite change in goals heavily suggests they realized their goals at the outset had 
been much to stringent for North Vietnam to ever accept. 
 Robert Pape argues the Linebacker II bombing campaign was successful because 
North Vietnam was “compelled to accept cosmetic changes that placated South 
Vietnam.”2  If this had been the case, then Linebacker II would have been at least 
partially successful—but the facts refute this finding in two ways.  First, as touched upon 
in Chapter 2, North Vietnam was always willing to accept cosmetic changes, including 
replacements of weapons and minor concessions on the wording of troops in the DMZ.3  
More essentially, it is illogical to suggest that one of the most extensive bombing 
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campaigns of the entire war was required to force North Vietnam to make “cosmetic 
changes.”  If the changes were truly cosmetic, it is safe to assume Le Duc Tho and North 
Vietnam would not have required a massive bombing campaign to sway them.   
 Second, and more importantly, after the bombing, Thieu and South Vietnam still 
stubbornly refused to accept the treaty without the major changes the United States had 
introduced earlier.  Obviously, then, the small changes that were agreed to did not 
“placate” Thieu.  This time, however, the United States simply called Thieu’s bluff and 
created a final draft of a peace treaty that Thieu could either sign—giving his country at 
least a chance of surviving—or refuse, leaving him mostly powerless against a much 
stronger North Vietnamese army.  Nixon wrote in his diary that “Thieu’s choice is simply 
whether to commit suicide or go along with a settlement that could save his country as 
well as himself.”4  As expected, Thieu eventually chose to accept the agreement when it 
was clear there was no way to improve it. 
 Thieu’s eventual acceptance of the agreement seems to suggest that the 
Linebacker II bombings were unnecessary.  If the United States had simply pressured 
Thieu harder in November, it is highly likely he would have signed the agreement then as 
well—a refusal to do so would have been as much “suicide” in November 1972 as it was 
in January 1973.  Of course, this is a historical counterfactual and as such can never be 
completely proven.  It is possible that Thieu needed the reassurance of American air 
power before he was willing to sign an agreement, and that the Linebacker II campaign 
served this purpose.  Regardless, the United States sought to compel North Vietnam to 
accept major changes in the peace agreement and failed to get any of these changes.  As 
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such, the Linebacker II bombings cannot truly be called an example of successful 
compellence, even if the bombing did advance some of the goals of the United States as 
byproducts. 
 Why did the North Vietnamese not accept these changes in the agreement?  The 
answer lies in the fact that, as noted in Chapter 3, North Vietnam believed it could 
withstand American bombing campaigns—especially given the very public knowledge 
that the United States Congress wanted to cut off funding for the war as soon as 
politically possible.  In other words, North Vietnam did not put any significant weight on 
the threat that the United States would continue large-scale bombing if Le Duc Tho and 
the other North Vietnamese officials did not accept major changes.  The American 
negotiators obviously realized this as well and as such did not press for these changes to 
be accepted with much force.  This was a clear credibility failure on the part of the United 
States.  While its interests were real, it lacked the first and most important aspect of 
successful credibility: commitment.  By 1973 it was obvious to the entire world that the 
United States sought to extricate itself from the Vietnam situation in any way possible, 
and as such the threat of renewed, long-term bombing held little weight. 
 The United States suffered a capability failure as well by not succeeding to 
effectively hurt North Vietnamese morale.  Pape argues that Linebacker II “damaged the 
North’s ability to carry out its conventional military strategy for overrunning the ARVN 
[i.e. the South Vietnamese army],” but this was by no means the primary goal of the 
bombing.5  Instead, as evidenced by what American planners said both at the time and in 
their memoirs after, the central goal was to convince the North Vietnamese that it was 
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better to accept major changes in the agreement than to subject their citizens and military 
personnel to further bombardment.  The bombing failed to convince them of this, 
however, and it is described in Chapter 3 how the bombing was actually a galvanizing 
force for North Vietnamese morale.  This means the United States chose the wrong 
method—air attack—for affecting their enemy’s will.  Choosing the right methods for 
compellence is a key attribute of the capability area of compellence and an area in which 
the United States failed. 
 Thus the United States failed to some degree both in terms of credibility—by 
lacking the commitment to the region necessary for a prolonged bombing attack—and in 
terms of capability—by choosing ineffective means to negatively affect North Vietnam’s 
will to fight on.  What is perhaps most notable about these failings is that both, with 
slightly more foresight, should have been foreseeable by United States planners.  The 
ultimate lesson to draw from the Linebacker II campaign and its aftermath is that 
planners in both political and military sectors must be sure that all aspects of 
compellence—capability, credibility, and clarity of demands—will work together to 
achieve success.  If even one of these three areas falters, the entire strategy will crumble 
as well. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
